As Civil Defence is mostly defunct, some of what appears on this site will be the authors own opinions. As much fact as possible is used and referenced with links appearing at the bottom where available.
During the Cold War, Civil Defence planning was a legal obligation on many organisations including (but not limited to) local Councils, Police and core elements of the national infrastructure. With the end of the Cold War those plans were shelved and the responsibility for Civil Defence planning moved from a local level, to a national level.
At the end of the Cold War, Civil Defence was converted to "integrated emergency management" (IEM) [1] which basically meant that emergency plans needed to prepare for general Civil emergencies rather than survival post a nuclear attack.
Until 2012 and the closure of the regional Government offices IEM was co-ordinated regionally through Regional Resilience forums and Contingency committees. However as the regional offices have now closed, planning has instead moved to the local level only, through Local Resilience forums co-ordinated by local police forces [2].
When planning responsibilities moved back to Central Government, they were originally handled by the Home Office Emergency Planning Division but the responsibility has since migrated to the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat [3]. As such, Civil Defence planning is now done by the Cabinet Office. Furthermore they are also responsible for the “Government War Book” – the active (how active we don’t know) plans for migrating the country to a war footing. So any Civil Defence planning is now conducted in secrecy.
Because planning is now restricted to Central Government, the range of plans are closely guarded. However over the duration of the Cold War, how the country would respond to a nuclear attack became quite evident. We can therefore make a number of assumptions and pick up a number of the key themes that evolved.
This page aims to deal with points 1-3. Other pages on our site deal with the other points
The nature of Central Government planning for wartime changed during the course of the Cold War. Initially the Government would have bunkered down in the former Spring Quarry complex (known – for a while as Burlington) at the Central Government War HQ [4]. However the Soviets knew about it – they were monitoring it on a daily basis from their Satelites and by 1968 and the Government War book we have access to at the PRO, the plan had changed.
Central Government would be split into a number of key groups and dispersed around the country. These groups (known amongst other things as PYTHON groups) would primarily be focussed on the international standing of the UK, both militarily and in recovery (particularly Food and Oil supplies). [5/6]
The plan today is known as the "Continuity of Central Government plan" [7] and whilst we don’t know a great deal, we do know involves:
To quote, "the continuity of Central Government plan will be activated by the Cabinet Office in response to a catastrophic or serious emergency affecting central London, including Whitehall."
What is interesting though is where the PYTHON groups would have been located in 1968 and the size. Mike Kenner has done a lot of research on this, and can be found on X (formally twitter) [8]. By 1988 the idea was the Central Government War HQ would become an accretion site after the war as opposed to being the main hideout. Initially there were 2 types of groups – Python and UK Supply Agency groups, but by 1988 a new “SSG” had appeared (https://twitpic.com/c1og6r). Whilst the number of staff in each group was about the same, each SSG was headed by 1 minister whilst the PYTHON (now RUBY) groups contained 6 ministers.
The locations we do know about for PYTHON (from the 1968 era) are:
PYTHON GROUPS
UKSA GROUPS
If we plot these on a map, you’ll see a key theme emerges.
I think its a fair assumption that these sites would not house the groups today and whether there are suitable ships that could take a survival group is also open to question (a decent search of the Merchant Navy Register could provide some answers). But I think the South coasts, South West, Wales and Scotland are great locations as they are away from main population groups and are unlikely to be affected by nuclear radiation due to their coastal location.
Furthermore we need to consider though how the UK has changed since the Cold War. At the time of writing (Summer 2024) 63.8% of the UK electricity supply is being met with Renewable Energy [9]. The focus of supply groups would therefore no longer need to focus on supply of as much Coal, Oil and Gas as these are a lot less significant in our energy supply. However Russia is very well aware of this [11] and so efforts to maintain and secure our renewable energy are highly important.
Furthermore, from the figures we can read about, it looks like PINDAR (under the MOD building) could well be one site for a survival group. This bunker only came online late in the Cold War but would fully be accessible today and be only a short dash for any PM ready to stay in London and keep going.
Tonfanou is a fascinating place [10]. The train station was built initially for the Army base (on the right in this street view) but with it no longer there is pretty much located in the middle of nowhere. Trains stop on request! For the Python group heading there it would have been a unique location to run the country!! They would camp here until Aberystwyth University became available where they would then be permanently stationed.
The other central component to Cold War civil defence planning was Regional Government bunkering down in Regional Government Hqs (RGHQS) with a team of staff made up of Broadcasters, Military and Emergency services amongst others. Headed by a senior MP/cabinet member, the regions would have functioned independently until a central Government could be reformed.
The shape of Regional planning has changed greatly since the end of the Cold War. The plans have always had a regional focus but with the closing of the Regional Government offices in 2012 this has now stopped. Regional emergency planning no longer occurs and so the question as to what would happen with todays regional Civil Defence is an interesting question.
Our assumption is that Regional teams would be deployed (as per the Cold War (and for a time were known as "RSG Groups")) to pre-determined safe locations in each region. From there the emergency centre would co-ordinate with Police, councils and the military to regain control and tackle the ongoing crisis.
This assumption is based on a number of facts:
To what extent sites have already been pre-selected is only known to the holders of the War Book, but in reality there would be many potential opportunities.
From there, the army and police would setup communication systems along with connecting to the HITs satelite system which would allow the teams access to key government data.